Dr. Andrews was very proud of his central reference

facilities and by late 1949 he felt that OCD was on

the track of a "far more effective solution to providing

anlysts with quick retrieval of intelligence information

than had ever, anywhere, been achieved before. " He devoted

32 pages to a detailed description of the Intellofax System,

entitling his monograph "Central Reference Facilities,

Status (1 November 1949) and Objectives." The Table of Contents

is indicative of the complete coverage of his subject:

> Summary
> Glossary (of terms)
> Magnitude of the Problem
> Classification Scheme
> Intellofax System
> Index Files
> Abstract Files
> Highly Specialized Reference Problems

In his usual dynamic approach, Andrews had briefed

specialists in ORE on the potentialities of the Intellofax

System and how analyst participation in the growth of the

file would benefit the system and therefore the whole agency.

In other words, he was asking analysts if they would like to contri-

bute abstracts to the file. He stated that only the specialist

could decide which are the important documents bearing upon his

field of his specialty, and only the specialist could write compe-

tent abstracts of such documents. His approach was to the NEA

Division of ORE first, because he knew the Division Chief well.

In January of 1949 the ████████ began selecting and abstracting

25X6A

~~SECRET~~

2

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those documents bearing on ███ which they regarded as most

important. The theory was that if the system could be

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made to work satisfactorily for the ███ abstracts, then it

could possibly be extended to ~~other~~ specialists on other

areas. OSI commenced operations on the same trial basis

and   25X6A

in February, the ███ desk of ORE in March. OCD meanwhile

continued to write abstracts of the table of contents type

needed for publications covering a wide variety of subjects

and areas. On pages 23 and 25 of the Intellofax study,

Dr. Andrews provided samples of OCD, ORE and OSI abstract

cards.

A so-called contributor code was punched into column 21

                                    a   ever
of the IBM card so that if ~~the~~ specialists wanted to retrieve

            his   he
only ~~their~~ own abstracted material ~~they~~ could do so.

had in itself yielded a number of unforeseen but highly

valuable by-products, such as: (a) time saved in producing

weekly and monthly summaries. A carbon copy of the abstract

sheet was filed in folders in strictly chronological order and

provided the desk chief a fully documented history of day-to-day events in the

two countries; (b) training of junior professionals was improved,

speeded up and thoroughly locked into the production system

by the assignment of writing abstracts; (c) technically difficult

reports no longer went into the "hold" basket, but were analyzed,

researched and abstracted; (d) file space was saved, since the

abstract could replace the original report. ~~This latter (d)~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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~~by-product of the abstract program was the basis for a memo directive~~
~~from Ad/ORR~~ [REDACTED] 2 years later ~~to all ORR analysts in 1951 to reduce their~~
to make wider use of
25X6A ~~files,~~ [REDACTED] Intellofax and to ~~contribute abstracts to~~
In 1950 ~~the System~~ [REDACTED] desks of MIE NEA, ~~had already~~
joined the program in January, and February of 1950 as had Agriculture/EE Division
(in May 1950.) ~~Some of these desks revamped their own policies~~
~~applied at least in the intelligence subject code.~~

25X6A ~~rapid growth of the abstract files as contributed by the~~
[REDACTED] ~~desks was cause for~~

Much as he had fostered and approved the abstract program, Rich
~~even in November 1919.~~
Dr. Andrews became concerned about the rapid growth of the abstract 23/
By the end of the year there were 18,047 abstracts(OCD-2847; ORE-6245;051-8955)
files. ~~He reported that on November 1 there were 17,500 abstracts~~
and
~~and that~~ they were growing at a staggering rate. He warned that

each extension of the system to a new group of specialists

involved difficult adjustments, revisions, and expansions in the
~~and~~ required more typists
Classification Scheme, and could be accomplished only by day-to-day

hard work. How true! The Chief of the Analysis Branch spent a

large proportion of her time in 1949 and 1950 working on changes

and expansions to the ISC to satisfy the needs of these new
25X6A
contributors. Area codes for [REDACTED]
were expanded to take care of provincial divisions. This later on

created some ~~additional~~ problems because they were never used for

retrieval in the overall Intellofax system. ~~Dr. Andrews was~~

~~concerned that more typists and classification people would~~

~~be needed if the abstract program grew too fast.~~

Dr Andrews concluded the Summary to his study with

these pertinent words:

> "Because of the selectivity being exercised in building up the abstract files, we are forging a tool which in years ahead will enable us to drain off from the Library those documents which are of scant importance, thus making room for the current inflow and ensuring that reports of real importance are held available. It is quite possible that the central reference system being build by CIA will ultimately prove the most important central intelligence service which the Agency provides."

The abstract program mushroom from its beginnings in 1949 reaching a crescendo in the early 1950's. The

25X6A

desks of NEA joined the program in 1950 as did Agriculture/EE Division. Some of these desks even set up their filing systems according to the ISC. Other divisions or branches began to contribute in 1951 on the

OCD 25X1A9a

encouragement of ████████████, AD for ORR for that one year, who was interested in space saving. However, the downward trend began shortly thereafter as specialists in ORR and OSI were not interested in spending their time learning how to use the Intelligence Subject Code correctly for in-depth indexing. OSI/Medicine contributed more abstracts than any other OSI component and it ceased doing so in 1955. ORR/Shipbuilding was the last ORR component to stop input in 1958.

OCD management had always hoped that these contributions by the specialists would preclude the indexing of these same documents by the OCD indexers. This was never possible, for the specialists frequently abstracted and coded only that part of the document that interested them. There was never any guarantee that the entire document would be covered. So duplication continued; both IBM cards would turn up on a machine run if the same codes had been used (and there was no guarantee of this, either). In such a case, the OCD indexer or librarian in screening the cards before an Intellofax tape was made

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would pull out the non-abstracted card. A great danger to the system

later surfaced when the abstract program had stopped. References turned

up on machine runs which could not be retrieved any longer, such

as articles in Russian scientific journals indexed by OSI and later

destroyed. No limit as to source material had been placed on the

specialist who was willing to abstract. In the mid 1960's

(exact date unknown) all IBM cards with the contributor code were pulled

and destroyed for they added nothing to the Intellofax file and, but

rather created retrieval difficulties.

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ISC
Use by Specialists in ORE and OSI

(from Dr. Andrews paper on Central Reference Facilities
Status 1 Nov 49 and Objectives)

page 4

Rapid growth of the abstract files is cause for administrative
concern. Each extension of the system to a new group of specialists
involves difficult adjustments, revisions and expansions in the Classification
Scheme. Any attempt to extend the system simultaneously to all ORE
specialists would create chaotic confusion in the Classification Scheme
and thus destroy all chance of developing a system satisfactory to all
concerned. zEvolution, not revolution, is called for.

page 5

Because of the selectivity being exercised in building up the
abstract files, we are forging a tool which in years ahead will enable us
to drain off from the Library those documents which are of scant importance,
thus making room for then current inflow and ensuring that reports of
real importance are held available.

It is quite possible that tje central reference system being
built by the CIA will ultimately prove the most important central
intelligence service which the Agency provides.